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Abstract: This article assesses whether the United Nations Security Council must respect 
human rights under international law when acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter. It argues that the Security Council has to respect human rights enshrined in those 
human rights treaties drawn up under the United Nations’ auspices and in non-peremptory 
customary international law, when this is not incompatible with the Security Council’s ob-
jective of maintaining or restoring international peace and security. The analysis also ar-
gues however that the Security Council must comply with peremptory international human 
rights, with no exception. The paper concludes that Chapter VII action by the Security 
Council is limited only to a small extent by international human rights standards. 
Keywords: United Nations Security Council, peace enforcement action, international hu-
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I. Introduction 
As the United Nations General Assembly stated, ‘… development, peace and security 
and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing’.1 However, there may also 
exist a confl ict between peace and security on the one hand, and respect for human 
rights on the other hand. The United Nations Security Council, in particular, may affect 
international human rights when adopting sanctions on the basis of Chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter to maintain or restore international peace and security. The Se-
curity Council has decided on economic embargos against Member States whose conduct 
constituted a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. Eco-
nomic embargos have repercussions on the distribution of food and medicine, and there-
fore on the nutrition and health and even the survival, of the population of the targeted 
State.2 These measures affect many international human rights, especially economic and 
social rights – such as the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to be free 
from hunger and the right to health.3 Economic embargos may also have a negative im-
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1 World Summit Outcome, GA Res 60/1 (24 October 2005), para 9, UN Doc A/RES/60/1. See also SC 
Presidential Statement 2007/1 (8 January 2007), 1, UN Doc S/PRST/2007/1.
2 SC Res 752 Bosnia and Herzegovina (15 May 1992), paras 4-5, UN Doc S/RES/752 (establishing an 
economic embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia); SC Res 661 Iraq-Kuwait (6 August 
1990), paras 3-4, UN Doc S/RES/661 (establishing an economic embargo against Iraq), completed by 
SC Res 687 Iraq-Kuwait (3 April 1991), para 1, UN Doc S/RES/687.
3 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereafter: ICESCR) art 11-12 (adopt-
ed 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) arts 11 and 12, 993 UNTS 7-8. 
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pact on civil and political human rights, such as, in particular, on the right not to be 
subjected to an inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or on the right to life.4 
The Security Council has also established embargos on aeroplane fl ights that could 
equally have human rights consequences.5 For instance, the right to health may be 
affected if a prohibition on fl ying prevents a necessary medical transfer.6
The diffi culty of reconciling the aim of the Security Council of the maintenance or 
re-establishment of international peace and security with human rights appears even 
more clearly when the Council adopts coercive measures against individuals, States’ 
representatives or non-State actors. Those individuals are nominated on lists established 
by sanctions committees of the Security Council.7 The list administrated by the – so 
called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Com-
mittee is the oldest one and has the broadest scope. Indeed, it concerns all members of 
ISIL or the Al-Qaida organisation and all associated individuals and entities.8 Security 
Council sanctions against individuals generally comprise an arms embargo, a travel ban 
and/or an assets freeze.9 A prohibition on travel could affect the right to family life if it 
prevented a person from joining his family.10 An assets freeze can have negative effects 
on the right to an adequate standard of living and, more generally, on the right to prop-
erty.11 Sanctions imposed by the Security Council on individuals, once they are listed on 
its sanctions lists, affect their civil rights.12 In conformity with article 14 of the ICCPR, ‘... 
in the determination ... of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be 
entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law’.13 However, neither the listing of individuals on sanctions lists of the 
Security Council nor their de-listing from those lists is done after a fair trial according to 
that provision.14 
4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereafter: ICCPR, adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976) art 6 and 7, 999 UNTS 174-175. 
 The right not to be subjected to an inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or the right to life 
may be found to be infringed as a result of the lack of necessities such as food and medical supplies. 
The right to life requires States to take positive measures. See UNHRC ‘General Comment 6 (Article 6)’ 
(1982) para 5 UN Doc A/37/40 93. 
5 SC Res 748 Libyan Arab Jamarihiya (31 March 1992), para 4, UN Doc S/RES/748 (imposing an aero-
plane fl ight embargo in Libya).
6 ICESCR art 11 (n 3) 7.
7 Lists of the sanctions committees available at <https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/informa-
tion> accessed 14 June 2016.
8 List available at <https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list> accessed 
14 June 2016. Individuals and entities belonging or associated with ISIL were added to the list in 
December 2015.
9 Eg SC Res 1390 Situation in Afghanistan (16 January 2002), para 2, UN Doc S/RES/1390.
10 ICCPR art 17 (n 4) 177 .
11 ICESCR art 11 (n 3) 7 and Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) 
art 17, GA Res 217 A (III), UN Doc A/RES/217 (III). 
12 The Court of First Instance of the European Communities and the UN Human Rights Committee re-
jected the classifi cation of the sanctions of the then Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions regime as criminal 
measures. Case T-47/03 Jose Maria Sison v Council of the European Union [2002] ECR II-00073 paras 
101 and 129; UNHRC Communication no 1472/2006 Nabil Sayadi and Patricia Vinck v Belgium (2008) 
UN Doc CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006 para 10.11.  
13 ICESCR art 14 (n 3) 176-177.
14 Except concerning the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list, the listing and de-listing of individuals 
are always decided by consensus by sanctions committees, composed by representatives of the Se-
curity Council members and politically infl uenced. 
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Measures adopted by the Security Council against targeted individuals may have a di-
rect impact on their human rights. For instance, the listing of individuals on a sanctions list 
by the Security Council has a negative impact on their right to due process. However, in 
general, the Security Council will not directly affect individuals and their human rights. 
Indeed, action by the Security Council needs generally to be implemented by Member 
States or sometimes by a regional organisation. The Security Council may have an impact 
on human rights indirectly, when its action is enforced by Member States or a regional 
organisation, without any margin of appreciation, and when this action contravenes those 
rights. For example, the freezing of assets of an individual decided on by the Security 
Council, enforced by Member States or by the European Union with no margin of discre-
tion, has an impact on the right to property. Petitioners have argued on several occasions, 
before judicial or quasi-judicial bodies, that measures implementing Security Council re-
solutions, without discretion, are illegal because they are contrary to human rights or fun-
damental rights – in particular of a procedural nature.15 These courts or quasi courts did 
sometimes make a statement concerning the obligation of the United Nations Security 
Council to respect international human rights. For instance, the European Court of First 
Instance reviewed, incidentally, the validity of a Security Council resolution but only as 
regards peremptory international human rights. It did not state whether the Security 
Council also had otherwise to comply with human rights enshrined in treaties or in non-
peremptory customary international law.16 More recently, the European Court of Justice 
asserted that the Security Council, in applying Chapter VII, must act ‘in accordance with 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations, including respect for human rights’.17 It 
is not clear whether the Court referred to respect for human rights by the United Nations 
Security Council, or, to respect for human rights by United Nations Member States that has 
to be promoted by the Security Council. Furthermore, the Court did not specify which hu-
man rights exactly are at stake. This article aims to correct such imprecision. This paper 
will consider whether, and to what extent, the Security Council must respect international 
human rights when acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. 
Part II of this study argues that the Security Council, acting on the basis of Chapter 
VII of the United Nations Charter, must observe human rights enshrined in human rights 
15 See in particular Nabil Sayadi and Patricia Vinck (n 12); Case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council 
of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2005] ECR II-03649; Joined 
Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v 
Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR I-06351; 
Case T-85/09 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v European Commission [2010] ECR II-05177; Joined Cases 
C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P European Commission, Council of the European Union, Unit-
ed Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Yassin Abdullah Kadi [2013] ECR I-518; Nada v 
Switzerland App no 10593/08 (ECtHR, 12 September 2012); Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc 
v Switzerland App no 5809/08 (ECtHR, 26 November 2013). For an analysis of reviews directed 
against measures implementing Security Council resolutions sanctioning individual non-State actors, 
Antonios Tzanakopoulos, ‘Collective Security and Human Rights’ in Erika de Wet & Jure Widmar (eds), 
Hierarchy in International Law (OUP 2012) 42, 49-61.
16 Case T-306/01 Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European 
Union and Commision of the European Communities [2005] ECR II-03533 para 277; Yassin Abdullah 
Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities (n 15) para 226; 
Case T-253/02 Chafi q Ayadi v Council of the European Union [2006] ECR II-02139 para 116; Case 
T-49/04 Faraj Hassan v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities 
[2006] ECR II-00052 para 92. 
17 European Commission, Council of the European Union, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland v Yassin Abdullah Kadi (n 15) para 104. 
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treaties drawn up under the auspices of the United Nations or in non-peremptory cus-
tomary international law, when this is not incompatible with the Council objective of 
maintaining or restoring international peace and security. The Security Council must do 
so when it implements itself its coercive action or when it requires from States the im-
plementation, without any margin of appreciation, of its coercive action. Part III then 
contends that the Security Council must comply with peremptory human rights, with no 
exception. This obligation applies when the Security Council implements its measures or 
when it asks States to enforce them, with no margin of discretion. Part IV fi nally con-
cludes that Chapter VII action by the Security Council is limited only to a small extent by 
international human rights standards. 
II.  A Derogable Obligation of the Security Council to 
Respect Human Rights Contained in United Nations 
Human Rights Treaties or in Customary International 
Law 
A.  A Derogable Obligation to Respect Human Rights Contained 
in United Nations Human Rights Treaties 
1. An Obligation to Promote and Encourage Respect for Human Rights 
As an organ of the United Nations, the Security Council is bound by the United Na-
tions Charter and enjoys powers only insofar as they are conferred on it or implied by 
that treaty.18 Indeed, for the International Court of Justice, ‘[t]he political character of an 
organ cannot release it from the observance of the treaty provisions established by the 
Charter when they constitute limitations on its powers or criteria for its judgment’.19 Re-
ference can also be made to a statement of the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia: ‘[i]n any case, neither the text nor the spirit of the Charter conceives of the 
Security Council as legibus solutus (unbound by law)’.20 In particular, in accordance with 
article 24 paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council ‘... shall act in 
accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations’.21 
The purposes and principles of the United Nations correspond to the purposes and 
principles of articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter.22 This was recognised by the 
International Court of Justice. Indeed, the Court stated that the United Nations must 
18 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt (Advisory Opinion) 
[1980] ICJ Rep 73, 89-90. 
19 Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter) 
(Advisory Opinion) [1948] ICJ Rep 57, 64. 
20 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) 
ICTY-94-1 para 28 (2 October 1995).
21 See also United Nations Conference on International Organization – Documents (United Nations & 
Library of Congress 1945-1955) vol 12 518-519; Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and 
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya v United States of America) (Order) [1992] ICJ Rep 114, 171 (dissenting opinion of Judge 
Weeramantry). 
22 United Nations Conference on International Organization – Documents (United Nations & Library of 
Congress 1945-1955) vol 11 387.
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respect the aim of the Charter to promote justice, that is referred to by article 1 of the 
Charter.23 Thus, as an organ of the United Nations, the Security Council must act in con-
formity with the Purposes and Principles of the fi rst two articles of the United Nations 
Charter. Article 1 paragraph 2 states in particular that one purpose of the United Nations 
is ‘... to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of ... 
self-determination of peoples’. Development of the observance of the principle of self-de-
termination of peoples is included in the more general purpose of the United Nations, 
under article 1 paragraph 3. In accordance with that provision, one aim of the United 
Nations is ‘[t]o achieve international co-operation ... in promoting and encouraging res-
pect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all’. Thus, the United Nations, 
including the Security Council, must promote and encourage respect for human rights by 
Member States. Article 55 refers to this obligation, stating that ‘…the United Nations shall 
promote ... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all’. Article 13 paragraph 1 gives to the United Nations General Assembly 
the duty to initiate studies and make recommendations for the aim of ‘…assisting in the 
realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms’. Article 62 paragraph 2 gives a 
similar function to the Economic and Social Council: the Council ‘…may make recommen-
dations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all’. Finally, in conformity with article 76 of the United Nations 
Charter, the trusteeship system shall ‘... encourage respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all’. The expression ‘human rights’, as thus included in several 
provisions of the United Nations Charter, is not defi ned in the Charter. The participants in 
the preparatory work of the United Nations Charter wanted to include a human rights 
declaration in the Charter. However, due to a lack of time, such a declaration was not 
drafted and included in the Charter.24 The project was postponed for later on. It took the 
form of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted on 10 December 1948 by 
the United Nations General Assembly.25
The Security Council can participate, and has participated in this purpose of the Uni-
ted Nations of the promotion of and encouragement for respect for human rights. The 
Security Council thus can condemn infringement of human rights by Member States and 
ask for observance of human rights. It can do so in simple recommendations, and also 
in binding resolutions.26 Indeed, the Security Council may qualify grave violations of hu-
man rights linked to a present or impending armed confl ict or other destabilisation of the 
security of a country or region as ‘a threat to the peace’. It may then order the relevant 
23 Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal (Advisory Opin-
ion) [1954] ICJ Rep 47, 57. See also Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of 
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) 
(Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 16, 52; Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Monte-
negro) (Order) [1993] ICJ Rep 325, para 101 (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht).
24 Ruth B Russel, A History of the United Nations Charter (The Brookings Institution 1958) 327-328. 
25 Bardo Fassbender, ‘Sources of human rights obligations binding the UN Security Council’ in Peter HF 
Bekker, Rudolf Dolzer & Michael Waibel (eds), Making Transnational Work in the Global Economy (CUP 
2010) 71, 88-89.
26 Eg SC Res 1456 (20 January 2003), para 6, UN Doc S/RES/1456; SC Res 1653 (27 January 2006), 
preamble, UN Doc S/RES/1653.
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State to cease the violations.27 The Security Council has also created peacekeeping ope-
rations whose aim is, among others, the promotion and protection of human rights.28 
Finally, the Security Council has established the international criminal tribunals for the 
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, competent to judge the criminal responsibility of repre-
sentatives of those States for grave violations of international humanitarian law, that 
also correspond to grave infringements of human rights.29 
The Security Council would not only be bound by the provisions of the Charter but 
also by any other international treaty to which the United Nations is a party.30 While the 
United Nations, including the Security Council, must promote and encourage respect for 
human rights, it is not itself a party to any human rights treaty. In general, international 
organisations are not party to human rights treaties.31 Indeed, accession to many human 
rights instruments is only open to States. Overall, when human rights treaties were 
drafted, it was not thought that international organisations could have a negative impact 
on individuals and their human rights.32 
It is today no longer contested that an international organisation enjoys a separate 
international legal personality from its Member States and that it is not simply an exten-
sion of these States.33 In particular, the legal personality of the United Nations has been 
beyond doubt since the Reparations Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Jus-
tice.34 An international organisation does not act on behalf of its Member States but on 
its own behalf. Thus, several domestic jurisdictions have refused to see an international 
organisation as the agent of its Member States.35 Consequently, organs of an international 
27 For instance, in Libya, in the preamble of resolution 1973, the Security Council condemned ‘… the 
gross and systematic violation of human rights, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappear-
ances, torture and summary executions’, among the Libyan population, committed by the Libyan au-
thorities and determined that the situation in Libya constituted a threat to international peace and 
security. SC Res 1973 (17 March 2011), preamble, UN Doc S/RES/1973.
28 Eg UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) that had to promote and protect human rights in Côte 
d’Ivoire. SC Res 2000 (27 July 2011), para 7, UN Doc S/RES/2000.
29 SC Res 827 (25 May 1993), para 2, UN Doc S/RES/827; SC Res 955 (8 November 1994), para 1, UN 
Doc S/RES/955. 
30 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt (n 18) 89-90. 
31 The European Union is an exception. It is party to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
People with Disabilities and it will probably become party to the Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights). In regard to the 
relation between the European Union and the European Convention on Human Rights, see CJEU Opin-
ion C-2/13 [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454. 
32 Frédéric Mégret and Florian Hoffmann, ‘The UN as a Human Rights Violator? Some Refl ections on the 
United Nations Changing Human Rights Responsibilities’ (2003) 25 Hum Rts Q 314, 315; Robert Kolb, 
Gabriel Porretto and Sylvain Vité, L’application du droit international humanitaire et des droits de 
l’homme aux organisations internationales (Bruylant 2005) 240-241.
33 Tarcisio Gazzini, ‘Personality of international organizations’, in Jan Klabbers & Asa Wallendahl (eds), 
Research Handbook on the Law of International Organizations (Elgar 2011) 33, 33. 
34 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1949] ICJ Rep 
174, 179. 
35 Concerning the Arab Organization for Industrialisation: Arab Organization for Industrialization, Arab 
British Helicopter Company and Arab Republic of Egypt v Westland Helicopters Ltd, UA Emirates, 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and State of Qatar, Swiss Federal Supreme Court, 19 July 1988, 80 ILR 658 
and the International Tin Council: JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry 
and others and Related Appeals, Maclaine Watson and Co Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry, 
Maclaine Watson and Co Ltd v International Tin Council, 26 October 1989, United Kingdom House of 
Lords, 81 ILR 681-682 (Lord Templeman) and 715-717 (Lord Oliver). 
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organisation do not act on behalf of their members but on that of the organisation.36 An 
international organisation continues to act on its own name even when its measures are 
adopted by unanimity of its Member States. Indeed, unanimity is only a procedural re-
quirement and does not change the legal nature of the measures that are attributable to 
the organisation.37 Therefore, as an international organisation, the United Nations has its 
own rights and obligations that are distinct from those of its Member States.38 In partic-
ular, it does not have to respect international treaties just because they are binding upon 
its Member States.39 Thus, the Security Council, as an organ of the United Nations, is not 
automatically bound by the human rights treaties binding upon its Member States. This 
is implicitly acknowledged by the United Nations Charter. Its article 103 provides, in the 
event of a confl ict, for the prevalence of the obligations of Member States under the 
Charter over their obligations under any other international agreement, including a hu-
man rights treaty. And it is widely recognised that this confl ict rule covers confl icts with 
secondary norms derived from the Charter, in particular binding resolutions of the Secu-
rity Council.40 
In conclusion, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, the United Nations, 
including the Security Council, must promote and encourage respect for human rights by 
Member States.41 The United Nations itself is not a party to any human rights treaty and 
is not bound by human rights treaties simply because they are binding upon its Member 
States. Could an obligation of the United Nations, including the Security Council, to ob-
serve human rights treaties to which United Nations Member States are party be de-
duced from the United Nations obligation for promotion and encouragement of respect 
for human rights? 
36 Acts of an organ of an international organisation are thus attributable to the Organisation. Art 6, 
para 1 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations. GA Res 66/100 (9 December 
2011) UN Doc A/RES/66/100. 
 According to Kelsen, the phrase used in art 24 UN Charter: ‘the Security Council acts on behalf’ of the 
UN Members, is ‘legaly irrelevant and, in addition, incorrect’. Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Na-
tions (Stevens & Sons Limited 1950) 280.
37 Daniel-Henri Vignes, ‘Le principe de l’unanimité dans les organisations européennes’ (1955) 
I Annuaire français de droit international 111, 112.
38 Niels Blokker, ‘International Organizations and Their Members’ (2004) 1 Int’L Org L Rev 139, 152-154. 
39 See generally Eric David, ‘Le droit international applicable aux organisations internationales’ in Dony 
Marianne (ed), Mélanges en hommage à Michel Waelbroeck (Bruylant 1999) 3, 18. 
40 This is recognised by courts, in particular by the ICJ: Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation 
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (n 21) 
126; by the Security Council itself: Andreas L Paulus & Johann Ruben Leiβ, ‘Article 103’ in Bruno 
Simma et al (eds), The Charter of the United Nations (3rd edn, OUP 2012) vol II 2111, 2124; by the 
drafters of the United Nations Charter: United Nations Conference on International Organization – 
Documents (United Nations & Library of Congress 1945-1955) vol 13 717; by academia: Report of 
the study group of the ILC (prepared by M Koskenniemi), Fragmentation of International Law: 
Diffi culties Arising from the Diversifi cation and Expansion of International Law (13 April 2006), 
para 331, UN Doc A/CN4/L 682. 
41 Emmanuel Decaux, ‘De la promotion à la protection des droits de l’homme’ in Société française de 
droit international (ed), La protection des droits de l’homme et l’évolution du droit international: actes 
du colloque de Strasbourg de 1997 (A Pedone 1998) 81, 82. 
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2.  An Obligation to Respect in Principle Human Rights Contained in 
United Nations Human Rights Treaties
The general principle of good faith implies that the parties to treaties interpret and 
implement those treaties in good faith.42 This general principle of international law is a 
paradigm in the international law of treaties and can also apply to the interpretation and 
application of the constituent treaties of international organisations by those organisa-
tions. As stated by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, gene-
ral principles of international law, as central values underpinning the international legal 
order, lay down ‘an obligation that is incumbent, not only on States, but also on other 
international entities including the United Nations’.43 The United Nations, including the 
Security Council, is therefore bound by the general principle of good faith. Both must 
thus interpret the provisions of the United Nations Charter in good faith.44 
The interpretation in good faith of a treaty corresponds to the reasonable interpreta-
tion of the terms of the treaty, taking into account the just expectations of the other 
party/parties.45 If the general principle of good faith is applied to article 1 paragraph 3 of 
the Charter, it can be argued that the obligation of the United Nations – and of its diffe-
rent organs – to promote and encourage respect for human rights includes the obligation 
to respect those human rights as much as possible. The latter obligation is relevant only 
for the United Nations activities which have an impact on individuals. This impact can be 
direct, for instance due to resolutions of the United Nations Security Council applied di-
rectly to individuals. The impact can also be indirect, for example due to measures that 
implement United Nations Security Council resolutions without any margin of apprecia-
tion. The United Nations has fulfi lled its purpose of promoting and encouraging obser-
vance of human rights. It has done so in particular in developing a body of human rights 
treaties. For instance, the ICCPR and the ICESCR were drew up by the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council, then adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.46 
Thus, if the United Nations interprets article 1 paragraph 3 of the Charter in good faith, 
as it should do, there is a legitimate expectation that it respects, to the greatest extent 
possible, human rights guaranteed by treaties prepared under its auspices, and in force, 
and that it asks States parties to those treaties, and United Nations members, to respect. 
42 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 
art 26 and 31, 1155 UNTS 339-340.
43 Dusko Tadić, 1995 (n 20) para 93.
44 Exposé oral de M le Professeur Spiropoulos, Effect of Awards of Compensation made by the United 
Nations Administrative Tribunal (Advisory Opinion) [1954] ICJ Pleadings 351. Robert Kolb, La bonne 
foi en droit international public (Presses Universitaires de France 2000) 509; Elisabeth Zoller, La bonne 
foi en droit international public (A Pedone 1977) 190; Vera Gowlland-Debbas, ‘Security Council En-
forcement Actions and Issues of State Responsibility’ (1994) 43 ICLQ 55, 94 (arguing that the princi-
ple of good faith limits the Security Council power in the implementation of art 39 of the UN Charter).
45 Award of the Tribunal of Arbitration in the Question Relating to the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries 
(Great Britain v United States of America) (7 September 1910) XI RIAA 173, 188; Case Concerning 
Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France v United States of America) 
(merits) [1952] ICJ Rep 176, 212; Case concerning the Aerial Incident of July 27th, 1955 (Israel v 
Bulgaria) (merits) [1959] ICJ Rep 127, 189 (joint dissenting opinion by Judges Hersch Lauterpacht, 
Wellington Koo & Percy Spender). For academic study, see Markus Kotzur, ‘Good Faith (Bona Fide)’ in 
Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2nd edn, North-Holland 
2012) 508, para 20; Oliver Dörr, ‘Article 31’ in Oliver Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds), Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Springer 2012) 521, 541.
46 Rhona KM Smith, International Human Rights (6th edn, OUP 2014) 43.
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As indicated by August Reinisch, ‘[w]hen the United Nations – the major promoter of 
human rights in the international arena – takes enforcement action, it can be legitimate-
ly held to show respect for human rights in an exemplary fashion’.47 Referring to the work 
of human rights monitoring organs, the prior Secretary General of the United Nations, 
Kofi  Annan, stated that: ‘[o]f course, the protection of human rights is not primarily the 
responsibility of this [Security] Council – it belongs to other United Nations bodies, 
whose work you do not need to duplicate. But there is a need to take into account the 
expertise of those bodies, and make sure that the measures you adopt do not unduly 
curtail human rights’.48 Support for the proposition that the United Nations as an orga-
nisation promoting and encouraging the observance of human rights obligations by 
Member States must itself observe, in principle, the same obligations, can be found in 
the Effect of Awards Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice.49 After having 
recognised that the United Nations is bound by the principle of justice, set up in article 1 
of the United Nations Charter, it referred to a duty of that organisation to establish a 
tribunal for staff disputes. For the Court, it would ‘... hardly be consistent with the ex-
pressed aim of the Charter to promote freedom and justice for individuals ... that [the 
United Nations] should afford no judicial or arbitral remedy to its own staff for the set-
tlement of any disputes which may arise between it and them’.50 Similarly, it would not 
be consistent with the expressed aim of the Charter to promote and encourage respect 
for human rights by Member States if the United Nations did not respect, as much as 
possible, those human rights guaranteed in treaties it initiated and that it wants Member 
States to observe. 
The obligation of the United Nations, in particular of the United Nations Security 
Council, to respect in principle human rights set out in United Nations human rights trea-
ties in force must be interpreted in the light of an evolving body of treaties. This obliga-
tion concerns today in particular those human rights enshrined in the two International 
Covenants of 1966.51 The ICCPR and the ICESCR are indeed the only general internatio-
nal human rights treaties prepared under the auspices of the United Nations. Further-
more, and more important, they are now ratifi ed or acceded to by more than three-quar-
ters of all States.52 Together with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the 
Covenants and their Protocols constitute the foundation of the United Nations system for 
the protection of human rights, the ‘International Bill of Human Rights’.53 
The implementation of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter by the Security 
Council shows that the Council tries to respect human rights in its coercive action. It has 
declared that it will ‘... give consideration to’ the potential impact of its mandatory mea-
sures on the civilian population, ‘... in order to consider appropriate humanitarian ex-
47 August Reinisch, ‘Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Accountability of the Security 
Council for the Imposition of Economic Sanctions’ 95 (2001) AJIL 851, 869. 
48 Statement of the Secretary General, addressing the Council Meeting on Counter Terrorism (18 January 
2002), available at <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sgsm8105.doc.htm> accessed 14 June 
2016.
49 Reinisch (n 47) 857. 
50 Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal (n 23) 57.
51 Both covenants refer in their preamble to the UN Charter obligation upon States ‘to promote universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms’.
52 In June 2016, 168 States are party to the ICCPR and 164 to the ICESCR.
53 Smith (n 46) 37. 
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emptions’.54 Along the same lines, it has affi rmed ‘... the necessity for sanctions to con-
tain adequate and effective exemptions to avoid adverse humanitarian consequences’: 
that includes effects on human rights.55 The Security Council exempts certain goods from 
its economic embargoes for humanitarian purposes, in particular medical supplies and 
educational materials.56 Aeroplane fl ight embargos may also include derogations on the 
ground of humanitarian need.57 Security Council Committees, subsidiary organs created 
by the Council, are responsible for interpreting humanitarian exemptions set up in Secu-
rity Council sanctions regimes. Humanitarian exemptions themselves are authorised by 
the relevant Security Council Committees or, under their supervision, by Member States 
of the United Nations.58 However, this case-by-case approach proved very often insuffi -
cient to cope with the severe humanitarian consequences of Security Council measures 
on broader parts of the population of targeted States,59 especially with respect to Iraq.60 
This brought the fi ve permanent members of the Security Council to confi rm, in 1995, 
that the impact on human rights of future collective actions of the Council had to be 
minimized.61 In order to reduce unintended side effects of sanctions on the civilian po-
pulation and also in order to enhance their effectiveness, comprehensive trade embargos 
were no longer enacted. New embargoes were often limited to specifi c goods such as 
arms, diamonds, and petroleum.62 
Furthermore, the Security Council declared that sanctions should be ‘... carefully 
targeted in support of clear objectives and implemented in ways that balance effective-
ness against possible adverse consequences’.63 The Security Council developed ‘smart 
sanctions’, targeted on State representatives responsible for any non-compliance with its 
decisions or on their family members.64 More recently, the Security Council also imposed 
54 SC Res 1325 (31 October 2000), para 14, UN Doc S/RES/1325.
55 SC Res 1333 (19 December 2000), preamble, UN Doc S/RES/1333. 
56 Eg SC Res 661 (6 August 1990), para 3, UN Doc S/RES/661; SC Res 687 (3 April 1991), para 20, UN 
Doc S/RES/687. 
57 Eg SC Res 748 (31 March 1992), para 4 a, UN Doc S/RES/748; SC Res 1267 (15 October 1999), 
para 4 a, UN Doc S/RES/1267.
58 Paul Conlon, ‘The Humanitarian Mitigation of UN Sanctions’ (1996) 42 German Yearbook of Interna-
tional Law 249, 257-260; Djacoba Liva Tehindrazanarivelo, ‘Le droit des Nations Unies et les limites au 
pouvoir de sanction du Conseil de sécurité’ in Laura Forlati and Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos (eds), Eco-
nomic Sanctions in International Law (Nijhoff 2014) 211, 260-261; Alexandros Kolliopoulos, ‘Les 
comités des sanctions de l’Organisation des Nations Unies’ in Laura Forlati & Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos 
(eds), Economic Sanctions in International Law (Nijhoff 2014) 567, 579-581. 
59 Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization, GA Res 54/1 (31 August 1999), 
para 124, UN Doc A/54/1. 
60 Report of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (21 June 2000), 
para 63-67, UN Doc E/CN 4/Sub 2/2000/33. See also among an abundant literature: Eric Hoskins, 
‘The Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions and War in Iraq’ in Thomas George Weiss et al 
(eds), Political Gain and Civilian Pain (Rowman & Littlefi eld 1997) 91, 110-129; René Provost, ‘Starva-
tion as a Weapon: Legal Implications of the United Nations Food Blockade Against Iraq and Kuwait’ 
(1992) 30 Colum J Transnat’l L 577, 583-588.
61 Letter dated 13 April 1995 from the Permanent Representatives of China, France, the Russian Federa-
tion, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to 
the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. Annex, 2, UN Doc S/1995/300. 
62 Eg SC Res 1343 (7 March 2001), para 6, UN Doc S/RES/1343 (prohibiting export of diamonds in 
Liberia).
63 SC Res 1730 (19 December 2006), preamble, UN Doc S/RES/1730. See also SC Press Statement 
2006/28 (22 June 2006), 2, UN Doc S/PRST/2006/28.
64 Eg SC Res 841 (16 June 1993), para 8, UN Doc S/RES/841 (imposing the freezing of assets belonging 
to the government of Haiti or to the de facto authorities in Haiti or controlled by such government or 
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sanctions on individuals and entities whose conduct cannot be attributed to a Member 
State.65 The Security Council aimed to reduce the impact of its sanctions on the targeted 
non-State actors. In particular, in order to take better consideration of the right to due 
process, the Security Council established a more independent procedure for de-listing 
members and entities from the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list than the proce-
dure as regards other individuals’ sanctions lists. The Ombudsperson, who is indepen-
dent and impartial, prepares recommendations on de-listing requests for the ISIL 
(Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee.66 Furthermore, the Security Council at-
tempts to improve precision, fairness and transparency in the listing and de-listing pro-
cedures for individuals’ sanctions lists.67 The Security Council also provides for humani-
tarian exemptions from sanctions against non-State actors.68 
In parallel to its attempts to reduce the negative impact of its sanctions on human 
rights, the Security Council has affi rmed that States should act in concordance with their 
human rights obligations when implementing its resolutions. For instance, in the context 
of the enforcement of counter-terrorist measures decided by the Security Council, the 
Council stated that: ‘States must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism 
comply with all their obligations under international law, and should adopt measures in 
accordance with international law, in particular international human rights ...’.69 There-
fore, Security Council resolutions should be interpreted and implemented, to the greatest 
extent possible, in conformity with the human rights obligations of United Nations Mem-
ber States.70
In conclusion, it is here argued that the Council must respect, with some exceptions, 
human rights guaranteed in treaties developed within the framework of the United Na-
tions and in force. Such an obligation is deduced from a reasonable interpretation of the 
United Nations Charter that is supported by the practice of the Security Council on Chap-
ter VII. The Security Council is bound by that obligation when it enforces coercive mea-
sures having an impact on individuals or when it requires from Member States to imple-
ment, without any margin of appreciation, coercive measures that affect individuals. 
authorities), completed by SC Res 917 (6 May 1994), paras 3-4, UN Doc S/RES/917; SC Res 1127 
(28 August 1994), para 4 a, UN Doc S/RES/1127 (imposing restrictions on the displacement of the 
senior offi cials of Uniăo Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) and of adult members 
of their immediate families in Angola), completed by SC Res 1173 (12 June 1998), para 11, UN Doc 
S/RES/1173; SC Res 1132 (8 October 1997), para 5, UN Doc S/RES/1132 (imposing travel prohibi-
tions for members of the military junta and adult members of their families).
65 SC Res 1390 (16 January 2002), para 2, UN Doc S/RES/1390 (on enforcement measures against 
Usama bin Laden, members of the Al-Qaida organization, the Taliban, and individuals and entities as-
sociated with them). 
66 Information on the de-listing procedure from the ISIL (Da’esh) & Al-Qaida sanctions list, available at 
<https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/procedures-for-delisting> 
accessed 14 June 2016.
67 For instance, the Security Council established the Monitoring Team to assess and make recommenda-
tions regarding implementation of coercive measures against the Al-Qaida organization, the Taliban, 
and individuals and entities associated with them. SC Res 1617 (29 July 2005), para 19 and annex I, 
UN Doc S/RES/1617. 
68 Eg the exemptions from the sanctions imposed on ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals 
and entities, available at <https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/travel-ban> accessed 
14 June 2016.
69 SC Res 1456 (20 January 2003), para 6, UN Doc S/RES/1456.
70 Al-Jedda v The United Kingdom App no 27021/08 (ECtHR, 7 July 2011) para 105. See also in favour 
of such a presumption Nabil Sayadi and Patricia Vinck (n 12) 36 (Individual opinion Sir Nigel Rodley 
(concurring)).
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That obligation also applies when Member States chose to transfer the implementation 
of Security Council measures to a regional organisation, such as the European Union. 
Part II C of this article will explain below when and to what extent the Security Council 
is allowed to derogate or to require a derogation from human rights of United Nations 
human rights treaties.  
B.  A Derogable Obligation to Respect Human Rights Contained 
in Customary International Law
As subjects of international law created by States in the international legal order, 
international organisations must respect the general rules of that order.71 As stated by 
the International Court of Justice, ‘[i]nternational organizations are subjects of interna-
tional law and, as such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under ge-
neral rules of international law ...’.72 If international organisations perform the same acts 
as States, they have to follow the same customary rules regulating these acts than the 
States.73 The United Nations in particular is in principle bound by customary internatio-
nal law relevant to its activities. Numerous human rights obligations have passed into 
general international law.74 Thus, they may address not only States, but also the United 
Nations when it takes acts having a direct impact on individuals. Such is in particular the 
case when the United Nations Security Council lists individuals on a sanctions list. The 
listing act directly affects the right to a fair trial whose core content – determination of 
any criminal charge against an individual, or of his/her rights and obligations in a suit at 
law by an independent and impartial tribunal – can be seen has having a customary in-
ternational legal nature.75 
Since the United Nations, including the Security Council, is in principle bound by cus-
tomary international law, in particular customary international human rights law, perti-
nent to its activities, it should not in principle adopt coercive measures whose implemen-
tation by Member States requires the violation of this law. This prohibition also applies 
when Member States transferred the implementation of Security Council measures to a 
regional organisation. Support for this rule can be found in article 15 of the Draft Articles 
on the Responsibility of International Organizations whose objective is to codify custo-
mary international law on the responsibility of international organisations. This provision 
states that: ‘[a]n international organization which directs and controls a State ... in the 
71 Henry G Schermers and Niels M Blokker, International Institutional Law (5th edn, Martinus Nijhoff 
2011) 835; Gérard Cahin, La coutume internationale et les organisations internationales (A Pedone 
2001) 513-520; David (n 39) 20-21. 
72 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt (n 18). See also 
Prosecutor v André Rwamakuba (Decision on Appropriate Remedy) ICTR-98-44C-T para 48 (31 Janu-
ary 2007).
73 Albert Bleckmann, ‘Zur Verbindlichkeit des allgemeinen Völkerrechts für internationale Organisa-
tionen’ (1977) 107 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 107, 113-114. 
74 Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights (3rd edn, OUP 2014) 42-43.
75 The core components of the right to a fair trial are indeed recognised in numerous domestic legal or-
ders as well as in regional and international human rights instruments, in particular in the ICCPR 
(art 14). See the study commissioned by the United Nations Offi ce of Legal Affairs: Bardo Fassbender, 
‘Targeted Sanctions and Due Process’ (2006) 1, 9-16, <www.un.org/law/counsel/Fassbender_study.
pdf> accessed 14 June 2016. It is however argued that the most fundamental guarantees of the right 
to a fair trial when the trial may lead to the death penalty are not only customary, but also peremp-
tory. See infra part III B.
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commission of an internationally wrongful act by the State ... is internationally responsi-
ble for that act if: (a) the former organization does so with knowledge of the circum-
stances of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) the act would be internationally 
wrongful if committed by that organization’.76 According to the International Law Com-
mission, ‘direction and control’ could encompass cases in which an international organi-
sation takes a decision that binds its Members and that must be carried out without 
discretion.77 Thus, in conformity with article 15, the United Nations would in principle 
engage its responsibility if the Security Council adopted coercive measures whose imple-
mentation, without any margin of appreciation, necessitated that Member States violate 
customary international law, including customary international human rights law. 
Since there is no hierarchy between treaties and that customary international law 
that is not peremptory,78 the United Nations Charter could authorise one or several of its 
organs to derogate from non-peremptory customary international law or to adopt mea-
sures whose enforcement by Member States involves deviation from that law in certain 
defi ned situations. In accordance with the second part of article 1 paragraph 1 of the 
United Nations Charter, the Security Council must act ‘... in conformity with the principles 
of justice and international law’ when it brings ‘... adjustment or settlement of interna-
tional disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace’. The obligation to 
conform to the principles of international law is not however contained in the fi rst part of 
article 1 paragraph 1, which addresses the Council function to ‘... take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppres-
sion of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace’. It is generally accepted that 
the expression ‘principles of international law’ covers international treaties, customary 
international law, and general principles of international law as referred to in article 38 
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.79 Thus, it looks like the Security 
Council does not have to act in conformity with the principles of international law, inclu-
ding customary international law, when it adopts collective measures to be implemented 
by Member States in order to prevent and remove threats to the peace, acts of aggres-
sion or other breaches of the peace. The Security Council seems to be allowed to require 
from Member States that they derogate from customary international law in the imple-
mentation of its Chapter VII measures.80 This literal interpretation of article 1 para-
graph 1 appears more clearly in the Spanish version of the Charter. It differentiates with 
the coordination conjunction ‘and’ (‘y’) and with a semicolon between the objective of the 
maintenance of international peace and security by the Security Council and the aim of 
76 Art 15 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (n 36). See also art 17 of the 
Draft on the circumvention by an international organisation of international obligations. In accordance 
with art 17, an international organisation incurs international responsibility even if it adopts a decision 
binding a Member State to commit an act that is not wrongful for the State, but would be wrongful if 
committed by the organisation.
77 Art 15 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations and its commentary (n 36). 
78 Since a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted by the international com-
munity of States from which no derogation is permitted, it must be a customary norm. Indeed, a 
customary norm is ‘evidence of a general practice accepted as law’ by the international community of 
States, in conformity with art 38 of the ICJ Statute.
79 Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘Article 1’ in Bruno Simma et al (eds), The Charter of the United Nations (3rd edn, 
OUP 2012) vol I 107, 113-114.
80 The ICTY assumed the Security Council power of deviation from customary international law. Prosecu-
tor v Dusko Tadić (Judgment) ICTY-94-1-A para 296 (July 15 July 1999). 
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the peaceful resolution of international disputes by the Security Council. Only the later 
aim must conform to principles of international law.81 The preparatory work confi rms that 
the omission of the ‘principles of justice and international law’ as a legal standard for 
peace enforcement action of the Security Council was intentional. During the delibera-
tions of the San Francisco conference, it was proposed that article 1 paragraph 1 be 
amended so as to read, ‘... to maintain international peace and security, in conformity 
with the principles of justice and international law’. This motion was however rejected.82 
The reason for the possible derogation by Member States from customary interna-
tional law when implementing Chapter VII Security Council resolutions lies in the neces-
sity for the effi ciency of the Council coercive peace-keeping action. In accordance with 
article 1 paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter, measures undertaken to maintain 
international peace and security must be ‘effective’. That the Security Council can require 
from Member States that they depart from general international law when implementing 
its mandatory measures fl ows from the purpose of those measures. Without the ability 
of Member States to deviate from general international law in enforcing Security Council 
resolutions, the Council would not be able to act effi ciently in the interests of interna-
tional peace and security.83 
In practice, the implementation by Member States of Security Council resolutions 
often necessitates that Member States deviate from customary international law.84 As an 
organ of the United Nations, the Security Council can of course interpret the constituent 
treaty of that organisation.85 However, only those interpretations of the Charter support-
ed by a majority of the United Nations Member States are authoritative. Indeed, an in-
ternational organisation is a derivative subject of international law and possesses only 
those powers conferred on it by the constituent treaty ratifi ed by the Member States. 
Although an international organisation is allowed to interpret its constituent instrument, 
it is not competent to impose interpretations objected to by a majority of its Member 
States.86 United Nations Member States do not contest the capacity of the Security Coun-
81 The Spanish version reads: ‘Los Propósitos de las Naciones Unidas son: 1. Mantener la paz y la segu-
ridad internacionales, y con tal fi n: tomar medidas colectivas efi caces para prevenir y eliminar ame-
nazas a la paz, y para suprimir actos de agresión uotros quebrantamientos de la paz; y lograr por 
medios pacífi cos, y de conformidad con los principios de la justicia y del derecho internacional, el 
ajuste o arreglo de controversias o situaciones internacionales susceptibles de conducir a quebran-
tamientos de la paz’. (emphasis added) The Spanish version is authoritative as well as the Chinese, 
French, Russian and English texts. UN Charter, art 111.
82 United Nations Conference on International Organization – Documents (United Nations & Library of 
Congress 1945-1955) vol 6 318 and 702. 
 For academic study, see Terry D Gill, ‘Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN 
Security Council to Exercise its Enforcement Powers Under Chapter VII of the Charter’ (1995) 26 NYIL 
33, 65-68. 
83 Erika de Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council 182 (Hart Publishing 
2004); Gill (n 82) 62. See also Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 
1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v United States v 
America) (merits) [1988] ICJ Rep 115, 167 (dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel).
84 The ICTY has recognised that ‘it is open to the Security Council ... to adopt defi nitions of crimes in the 
[ICTY] Statute which deviate from customary international law’. Dusko Tadić, 1999 (n 80) para 296. 
See also Nico Krisch, ‘Introduction to Chapter VII: The General Framework’ in Bruno Simma et al 
(eds), The Charter of the United Nations (3rd edn, OUP 2012) vol II 1237, 1257.
85 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter) (Advisory Opinion) 
[1962] ICJ Rep 151, 159-161.
86 United Nations Conference on International Organization – Documents (United Nations & Library of 
Congress 1945-1955) vol 13 720. See also Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence 
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cil to adopt measures whose implementation involves the deviation from non-perempto-
ry customary international law.87 The interpretation made by the Security Council of ar-
ticle 1 paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter, in conformity with which it can impose 
to Member States a derogation from non-peremptory customary international law, 
should thus be considered as authoritative. 
It is therefore concluded here that the Security Council may ask Member States to 
depart from non-peremptory customary international law, when they implement its 
Chapter VII action. This conclusion also applies when Member States transferred the 
implementation of Security Council action to a regional organisation, such as the Euro-
pean Union. If the Security Council is allowed to require that Member States derogate 
from non-peremptory customary international law binding upon them, it must a fortiori 
also be authorised to disregard non-peremptory customary international law directly 
binding upon it. The objective is the same: to lead to a greater effi ciency of the Security 
Council in maintaining or restoring international peace and security. Thus, the Security 
Council may adopt measures whose implementation by other subjects than the United 
Nations involves the deviation from general international human rights law that is not 
peremptory, or the Security Council may deviate from that law itself. 
The Council may derogate from non-peremptory customary international law, inclu-
ding customary international human rights law, but only to some extent. Similarly, it is 
submitted that the Security Council can ask Member States to derogate from non-pe-
remptory customary international law, for instance from customary international human 
rights law, only within certain limits. These positions are confi rmed by the preparatory 
work of the United Nations Charter. The committee dealing with the preparatory work on 
the preamble, purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter objected to the in-
clusion of the words ‘principles of justice and international law’ in the fi rst sentence of 
article 1 paragraph 1.88 The committee on the structure and procedures of the United 
Nations Charter stated that this did not mean that the Security Council was completely 
not bound by international law.89 These two committee’s positions can be reconciled if 
the Security Council is allowed to deviate from principles of international law, encom-
passing non-peremptory customary international law, only within certain confi nes and to 
adopt measures whose implementation involves a derogation from this law only within 
certain restraints.90 International courts share the same point of view. For the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, unless the Security Council clearly expresses 
the opposite, there is a presumption that the Council does not want to disregard custo-
mary international law, including customary international human rights law.91 According 
to the European Court of Human Rights, ‘there must be a presumption that the Security 
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 
(1970) (n 23) para 22.
87 Evelyne Lagrange, ‘Le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies peut-il violer le droit international?’ 
(2004) 37 Revue belge de droit international 568, 580. 
88 Supra n 82.
89 United Nations Conference on International Organization – Documents (United Nations & Library of 
Congress 1945-1955) vol 11 378-380.
90 De Wet (n 83) 186-187. 
91 Dusko Tadić, 1999 (n 80) para 296. 
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Council does not intend to impose any obligation on member States to breach fundamen-
tal principles of human rights’, that include customary human rights.92 
This article will explain below, when and to what extent the Council is allowed to 
derogate or to ask United Nations Member States to derogate from general international 
law, especially from general international human rights law, when acting under Chapter 
VII. There is however an exception to this possible derogation. As will be shown in part 
III of this paper, the Security Council must respect peremptory international human 
rights law and cannot require from Member States a deviation from this law.
C. Application of the Necessity-Proportionality Principle 
1. The Principle 
Once the Security Council has determined that there is a threat to the peace, a 
breach of the peace, or an act of aggression, it can recommend or decide what measures 
are to be taken in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. The en-
forcement measures adopted by the Security Council are of three kinds: provisional 
measures, non-military enforcement measures or military enforcement measures (arti-
cles 40, 41 and 42 of the United Nations Charter respectively). In accordance with arti-
cle 40, the Security Council may ‘... call upon the parties concerned to comply with such 
provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable’ (emphasis added). In confor-
mity with article 42, should the Security Council consider that non-military coercive mea-
sures provided for in article 41 ‘... would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate’ 
(emphasis added), it may take a forcible action ‘... as may be necessary to maintain or 
restore international peace and security’ (emphasis added). 
The Security Council is not obliged to fi rst adopt recommendations before going on 
to enforcement measures. It is even not obliged to have recourse fi rst to non-forcible 
measures before deciding on forcible measures. However, Chapter VII coercive measures 
must be necessary to counter or remove the threat to, or breach of, the peace, or act of 
aggression, and must be adapted to this end. In particular, with the ‘adequacy’ guidance 
in the implementation of articles 41 and 42, the Charter shows a desire to minimise the 
effect of enforcement measures without, as much as possible, compromising their effec-
tiveness. There must be a rational link between the means and the end pursued, imply-
ing that the end should be achieved by the least restrictive means. This was affi rmed in 
debates of the Security Council.93 Similarly, the General Assembly stated that ‘... 
[s]anctions should be resorted to only with the utmost caution, when other peaceful 
options provided by the Charter are inadequate’.94 Reference should also be made to the 
International Court of Justice, which found that action taken by the United Nations, 
which is ‘... appropriate for the fulfi lment of one of [its] stated purposes’ (emphasis add-
ed), is presumed to be intra vires.95 In conclusion, Chapter VII of the United Nations 
92 Al-Jedda (n 70). See also in favour of such a presumption Nabil Sayadi and Patricia Vinck (n 12) 36 
(individual opinion of Sir Nigel Rodley (concurring)).
93 Eg the debate on Security Council sanctions in (2000) UN Doc S/PV 4128. 
94 Annex II, GA Res 51/242 (15 September 1997), para 1, UN Doc A/RES/51/242.  
95 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter) (n 85) 168.
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Charter indicates that the Security Council is bound by a principle of necessity-propor-
tionality in the implementation of that Chapter.96 
As explained above, in part II A 2, in accordance with the principle of good faith, the 
Security Council must respect, as much as possible, human rights guaranteed by the 
United Nations treaties on human rights in force in two situations. First, it must do so 
when adopting measures affecting directly individuals. Second, it must do so when ta-
king measures having an impact on individuals indirectly, through their implementation 
by United Nations Member States without any margin of appreciation – or by a regional 
organisation to which Member States transferred the implementation of Security Council 
measures. Furthermore, in conformity with the principle of necessity-proportionality, the 
Security Council must adapt the scope of its peace enforcement action to what seems to 
be necessary and proportionate to maintain or re-establish international peace and se-
curity. If the latter principle is applied to the obligation of the Security Council to respect 
in principle human rights in United Nations human rights treaties, it appears that the 
Council must respect those rights when adopting measures affecting individuals or when 
asking United Nations Member States to adopt measures having an impact on individu-
als, unless it is necessary to derogate from those human rights for the success of its 
coercive peace-keeping action. The scope of the derogation must then be as minimal as 
possible, and only to the extent required by the objective pursued, namely the mainte-
nance or restoration of international peace and security. 
As stated above, in part II B, the Security Council may, in peace enforcement action, 
derogate from non-peremptory customary international law, including customary inter-
national human rights law. It may also impose on United Nations Member States the 
need to derogate from that law in the enforcement of its mandatory measures. The im-
plementation of the principle of necessity-proportionality inherent in coercive peace-kee-
ping action of the Security Council allows it to ascertain when and to what extent the 
Council can fi rst, deviate from non-peremptory customary international law, in particular 
from customary international human rights law, second, can ask Member States to de-
viate from that law. It is submitted that the Security Council is allowed to do so, only if 
it is necessary for the success of its measures of peace enforcement and only to the 
extent required by this aim. Thus, the necessity-proportionality principle should apply to 
the deviation by the Security Council from human rights whether they are only enshrined 
in United Nations human rights treaties or also in non-peremptory customary interna-
tional law. For instance, this principle should be implemented to the departure by the 
Security Council from the right to a fair trial guaranteed in the ICCPR (article 14) as well 
as, at least in its core components, in non-peremptory customary international law.97 The 
necessity-proportionality principle also applies when the Security Council requires from 
96 Judith G Gardam, ‘Legal Restraints on Security Military Enforcement Action’ (1995-1996) 17 Mich J. 
Int’l L. 285, 298; Krisch, ‘Introduction to Chapter VII : The General Framework’ (n 84) 1260; Anto-
nios Tzanakopoulos, Disobeying the Security Council (OUP 2011) 64-65; Gérard Cahin, ‘La notion de 
pouvoir discrétionnaire appliquée aux organisations internationales’ (2003) 107 Revue générale de 
droit international public 535, 578-579.
97 For the customary nature of the core components of the right to a fair trial – determination of any 
criminal charge against an individual, or of his/her rights and obligations in a suit at law by an inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal –, see supra n 75. It is however argued that the most fundamental 
guarantees of the right to a fair trial when the trial may lead to the death penalty are not only custom-
ary, but also peremptory. See infra part III B.
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Member States to depart from human rights in United Nations Human Rights treaties, 
and for some of those rights, also in non-peremptory customary international law.98
‘Necessity’ concerns whether the objective of the maintenance or restoration of inter-
national peace and security warrants a derogation from human rights; ‘proportionality’ 
determines the scope of the derogation from human rights that is justifi ed to achieve the 
goal. The United Nations, acting through the Security Council, has at its disposal a legal 
‘opt-out’ regime, similar to legal emergency regimes that exist in most domestic legal 
orders.99 It can ‘contract out’ of human rights guaranteed in United Nations human rights 
treaties, and, for some of those rights, also in non-peremptory customary international 
law. It can also require Member States that they depart from those rights in the imple-
mentation of its measures. It can do so in an emergency, that of a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace or act of aggression and only if it is necessary to react to that emer-
gency. 
In conclusion, the Security Council is bound by an obligation to observe human rights 
enshrined in United Nations human rights treaties and, for some of those rights, in 
non-peremptory customary international law. It is also bound by an obligation not to 
adopt measures whose implementation by United Nations Member States necessitates 
that they disregard those human rights. The same prohibition applies in the situation 
when Member States transferred the implementation of Security Council measures to a 
regional organisation, such as the European Union. The Security Council can depart from 
the two obligations referred to above, only if it is necessary for and proportionate to its 
aim of the maintenance or re-establishment of international peace and security. There-
fore, it is here argued that the Security Council is only bound by derogable obligations of 
direct and indirect respect for those human rights guaranteed in United Nations human 
rights treaties and, concerning some of those rights, in non-peremptory customary in-
ternational law.  
2. Its Application 
The United Nations Charter gives to the Security Council a broad margin of appre-
ciation with respect to the necessity and proportionality of its coercive action.100 Arti-
cle 40 refers to provisional measures that the Security Council ‘deems’ appropriate 
whereas article 42 allows for military action should the Council ‘consider’ that measures 
under article 41 were inadequate or would be inadequate. As correctly stated by the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, ‘... the Security Council has a very wide 
margin of discretion under article 39 to choose the appropriate course of action and to 
evaluate the suitability of the measures chosen, as well as their potential contribution to 
98 Fassbender, ‘Sources of human rights obligations binding the UN Security Council’ (n 25) 91 (applying 
the principle of necessity-proportionality to the impact on human rights by Security Council meas-
ures).
99 Simon Chesterman, ‘UNaccountable? The United Nations, Emergency Powers, and the Rule of Law’ 
(2009) 42 Vand J Transnat’l L 1509, 1512; Georges Abi-Saab, ‘The Security Council Legibus Solutus? 
On the Legislative Forays of the Council’ in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Marcelo Kohen (eds), 
International Law and the Quest for its Implementation (Brill 2010) 23, 29; Devon Whittle, ‘The Limits 
of Legality and the United Nations Security Council: Applying the Extra-Legal Measures Model to Chap-
ter VII Action’ (2015) 26 EJIL 671, 679-680. 
100 Krisch, ‘Introduction to Chapter VII: The General Framework’ (n 84) 1260; Tzanakopoulos (n 96) 66.
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the restoration or maintenance of peace’.101 If this statement is applied to the observance 
of human rights by the Security Council, it is here argued that the Council has a signifi -
cant degree of discretion in assessing whether and to what extent it is necessary for the 
success of its enforcement action to derogate from human rights guaranteed in United 
Nations human rights treaties. The same applies for some of those rights that are also 
guaranteed in non-peremptory customary international law. It is also argued that the 
Council has a similar degree of discretion in deciding whether and to what extent it can 
require from Member States a derogation from human rights, whether those rights are 
only enshrined in United Nations human rights treaties or also in non-peremptory cus-
tomary international law. 
The broad margin of appreciation the Security Council enjoys in determining whether 
a derogation from human rights is necessary and proportional to the aim pursued is 
confi rmed by the practice of the Council and of its sanctions committees, in the adoption 
of humanitarian exemptions to enforcement measures. This practice is very diverse from 
one sanctions regime to another.102 Such heterogeneity can even be found within a sole 
sanctions regime. A sanctions committee may refuse a humanitarian derogation that it 
however allowed in another apparently similar case.103 It is to be noted that the lack of 
transparency in the activity of the Security Council and of its sanctions committees 
makes it diffi cult to determine common legal requirements in the attribution of humani-
tarian exemptions.104 The Security Council and its sanctions committees make assess-
ment on a case by case basis, with an important degree of discretion, on how to respect 
human rights in the Council Chapter VII action.105 
Thus, coercive measures of the Security Council should be unlawful only if their im-
pact on human rights embodied in United Nations human rights treaties in force is ma-
nifestly not necessary for the success of its peace enforcement action and/or out of all 
proportion to this purpose. The same applies as regard some of those rights that are also 
guaranteed in non-peremptory customary international law. Similarly, mandatory mea-
sures of the Security Council should be unlawful when they impose on Member States an 
impact on those human rights contained in United Nations human rights treaties in force, 
where it is manifestly not necessary for the maintenance or restoration of world peace 
and/or totally in disproportion to this aim. Again, the same applies for some of those 
rights that are also in non-peremptory customary international law. Along similar lines, 
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia recognised that the power to review 
Security Council action exists in the case of a ‘manifest contradiction with the Principles 
and Purposes of the Charter’ (emphasis added).106 
101 Dusko Tadić, 1995 (n 20) para 32. 
102 On the application of exemptions to enforcement measures by Security Council sanctions commit-
tees, Gian Luca Burci, ‘Interpreting the Humanitarian Exceptions through the Sanctions Committees’ 
in Vera Gowlland-Debbas (ed), United Nations Sanctions and International Law (Kluwer Law Inter-
national 2001) 143-154; Conlon (n 58) 249-284; François Alabrune, ‘La pratique des comités de 
sanctions du Conseil de sécurité depuis 1990’ (1999) 45 Annuaire français de droit international 226, 
239-249.
103 Burci (n 102) 145 note 3.
104 Kolliopoulos (n 58) 583; Dorothee Starck, Die Rechtmäβigkeit von UNO-Wirtschaftssanktionen in 
Anbetracht ihrer Auswirkungen auf die Zivilbevölkerung (Duncker & Humblot 2000) 136-137.
105 Burci (n 102) 145. 
106 Dusko Tadić, 1995 (n 20) para 21.
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The necessity-proportionality principle also justifi es derogations by States from most 
of the human rights guaranteed by the ICCPR. In accordance with article 4 paragraph 1 
of the Covenant: ‘... [i]n time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation 
and the existence of which is offi cially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Cove-
nant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Cove-
nant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’.107 For the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee, a public emergency could be ‘... a natural catastro-
phe, a mass demonstration including instances of violence, or a major industrial acci-
dent’108 as well as an international armed confl ict or a violent internal unrest.109 Article 4 
paragraph 1 of the ICCPR is similar to article 15 paragraph 1 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights.110 The organs monitoring the Convention have given more precise 
criteria than the Human Rights Committee to determine a state of emergency, which 
may be drawn upon for the interpretation of article 4 of the Covenant. For the European 
Commission of Human Rights, a public emergency must be actual or imminent; its ef-
fects must affect the whole nation; it must threaten the continuance of the organised life 
of the community; it must relate to an exceptional crisis or danger.111 It is argued that 
the concept of ‘public emergency’ is similar to the concepts of ‘threat to the peace’, 
‘breach of the peace’, or ‘act of aggression’ of Chapter VII of the United Nations Char-
ter.112 All concepts suppose the existence of a crisis that is actual or imminent, that af-
fects a community – a national community or the international community of States – 
and that threatens the functioning of that community.113 Furthermore, like a public emer-
gency in a State, a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, is of-
fi cially proclaimed at the international level by the United Nations Security Council. 
The question then arises whether article 4 paragraph 1 of the Covenant could be 
applied by analogy to Chapter VII action in order to justify the deviation from interna-
tional human rights in the implementation of Security Council measures. In conformity 
with the Covenant, the scope of the derogations from human rights is strictly necessary 
107 ICCPR art 4, para 1 (n 4) 174. A derogation from art 6, 7, 8, 11, 15, 16 and 18 ICCPR is however 
inadmissible in accordance with art 4 para 2. In addition to their derogation, many human rights 
provide themselves for their limitations. In the ICCPR, a number of articles refer to limiting human 
rights if it is provided by law and necessary in order to protect national security, public order, public 
health, morals, the rights and freedoms of others, or public safety. 
108 UNHRC ‘General Comment 29 States of Emergency (Article 4)’ (2001) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev 1/
Add.11 para 3.
109 As recognised in the doctrine of the Committee in reviewing States’ reports and in the proceedings 
under the First Optional Protocol: Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(NP Engel 2005) 89-90. 
110 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention 
on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) art 15, para 1. 
111 Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v Greece App no 3321/67, no 3322/67, no 3323/67, 
no 3344/67 (5 November 1969) 12 EHRR 83 para 113. See also Ireland v The United Kingdom App 
no 5310/71 (ECtHR, 18 January 1978) paras 205-224.
112 For a defi nition of the concepts, Nico Krisch, ‘Article 39’ in Bruno Simma et al (eds), The Charter of 
the United Nations (3rd edn, OUP 2012) vol II 1272, 1278-1294 
113 Scott Sheeran & Catherine Bevilacqua, ‘The UN Security Council and international human rights 
obligations’ in Scott Sheeran & Nigel S Rodley (eds), Routledge Handbook of International Human 
Rights Law (Routledge 2013) 371, 399. Also Gerhard Thallinger, ‘Sense and Sensibility of the Human 
Rights Obligations of the United Nations Security Council’ (2007) 67 Zeitschrift für ausländisches 
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 1015, 1029.
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and proportionate to address the public emergency.114 Such a qualifi ed necessity-propor-
tionality requirement could not be analogously implemented to United Nations Chapter 
VII action. Indeed, as was shown previously, a more lenient, ordinary, necessity-propor-
tionality principle applies to the Security Council in its choice of appropriate action to 
address a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, in particular in 
its decision on whether and how to deviate from international human rights.115 However, 
the Security Council should use the interpretation of human rights derogations from the 
Covenant by States and the Human Rights Committee as guidance in the balance it 
makes between the maintenance of international peace and security and the protection 
of human rights. The requirements of necessity and proportionality, justifying a deroga-
tion from the ICCPR, should inform the content and scope of the necessity-proportionali-
ty principle, justifying a derogation from international human rights in the implementa-
tion of Security Council Chapter VII measures.116 
The legal standard governing the obligation of the Security Council to respect human 
rights when implementing coercive measures or when imposing the implementation of 
coercive measures to Member States, must be applied to the circumstances of each si-
tuation. The threshold for derogations from human rights cannot be abstract but needs 
to be assessed contextually. First of all, the Security Council must establish which human 
rights exactly could be affected by an act it aims to adopt, whether the act is implemen-
ted by the Council itself or by Member States, without any margin of appreciation – or 
sometimes by a regional organisation to which Member States transferred the imple-
mentation of Security Council action. Then, the Security Council should balance the ob-
jective of securing international peace and security with the objective of protecting the 
relevant human rights to the greatest possible extent in the particular case. A derogation 
from human rights of a particular group of persons in the implementation of a Security 
Council measure must be necessary and proportionate to the objective the measure is 
meant to reach at a given moment. The requirements of necessity and proportionality 
must be applied to the geographical and material scope as well as to the duration of the 
human rights derogation. Thus, the Security Council should assess whether its sanctions 
target the proper individuals. The Security Council should ensure that its sanctions do 
not affect human rights of those individuals in an unnecessary and unproportioned way. 
Finally, the Security Council should adopt sanctions only as long as that appears neces-
sary. Sanctions that continue for a long period of time and that are without effects in 
securing world order may become unlawful.117 In assessing the necessity and proportio-
114 ‘General Comment 29, States of Emergency (Article 4)’ (n 108) para 4; Jaime Oraa, Human Rights 
in States of Emergency in International Law (Clarendon Press 1992) 152-159. The strict necessity-
proportionality principle is not temporised by the Human Rights Committee that is reluctant to grant 
States parties a margin of appreciation in the implementation of art 4 of the Covenant. Dominic 
McGoldrick, ‘The Interface between Public Emergency Powers and International Law’ (2004) 2 Inter-
national Journal of Constitutional Law 380, 400.
115 Erika de Wet, ‘The Role of Human Rights in Limiting the Enforcement Power of the Security Council: 
A Principled View’ in Erika de Wet & André Nollkaemper (eds), Review of the Security Council by 
Member States (Intersentia 2003) 7, 18. 
116 Christopher Michaelsen, ‘Human Rights as Limits for the Security Council: A Matter of Substantive 
Law or Defi ning the Application of Proportionality?’ (2014) 19 Journal of Confl ict & Security Law 451, 
468. 
117 Working paper prepared by Marc Bossuyt for the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights, The Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions, E/CN 4/Sub 2/2000/33, paras 
43-45.
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nality of the human rights implications of its measures for the aim of maintaining or re-
storing international peace and security, the Security Council should enjoy a broad mar-
gin of appreciation. 
The legal standards of necessity and proportionality have been applied by European 
Courts to States or a regional organisation, when they implemented Security Council 
action, with no margin of appreciation. It is here submitted that similar standards should 
be applied to the Security Council itself, when it imposes on Member States the enforce-
ment of its action, without any leeway for discretion. The Courts of the European Union 
and the European Court of Human Rights balanced the objective of international peace 
and security pursued by the implementation without any latitude of Security Council 
resolutions, with respect for human rights by States or a regional organisation. In 
Bosphorus v Minister for Transport, Energy and Communication and others, the appli-
cant, Bosphorus Airways, complained that a European Community Regulation giving ef-
fect in the then Community legal order to a Security Council resolution deciding a trade 
embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), infringed its 
fundamental rights, such as its right to peaceful enjoyment of its property and freedom 
to contract a commercial activity. Indeed, an aircraft belonging to Bosphorus Airways 
was impounded by an Irish ministerial order under the European Community Regulation. 
The European Court of Justice decided that the embargo imposed by the Security Coun-
cil resolution was to apply to the aircraft. The Court noted that the objective of funda-
mental importance to the international community, which was to re-establish peace and 
security in Bosnia-Herzegovina, supervened over the rights of Bosphorus. It then ruled 
that the impounding of the aircraft was neither inappropriate nor disproportionate.118 
In the fi rst Kadi and Yusuf cases, the applicants, individuals listed on the then 
Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions list, complained that a European Community Regulation 
implementing a Security Council resolution infringed several of their rights, in particular 
their right to respect for property guaranteed under the then European Community 
Law.119 Indeed, their funds were frozen by the contested regulation. The European Court 
of First Instance established that the Security Council sanctions decided against the lis-
ted individuals pursued a fundamental public interest for the international community, 
namely the fi ght against threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist 
acts. Taking this objective into consideration, the Court decided that the freezing of funds 
did not constitute ‘... an arbitrary, inappropriate or disproportionate interference’ (em-
phasis added) with the right to property.120 The most recent Kadi case concerned an 
appeal against a judgment of the General Court (previously the European Court of First 
Instance) that had annulled a new European Community Regulation maintaining the 
listing of Mr Kadi on the sanctions list.121 The appellants challenged both the standard of 
review applied by the General Court, and the way it dealt with the substantive claims by 
Mr Kadi (violation of the rights of the defence, the right to effective judicial protection, 
118 Case C-84/95 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v Minister for Transport, Energy and 
Communications and Others [1996] ECR I-3978 para 26.
119 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities 
(n 15); Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation (n 16).
120 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities 
(n 15) para 251; Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation (n 16) para 302. See 
also Chafi q Ayadi (n 16) para 125; Faraj Hassan (n 16) para 101. 
121 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v European Commission (n 15). 
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and the principle of proportionality as it relates to the protection of property as protected 
by European Union Law). The European Court of Justice admitted that considerations to 
do with international security may preclude the disclosure of some information concer-
ning the listing or the maintenance of the listing of a person on the then Al-Qaida sanc-
tions list and thus the impact on his/her procedural rights.122 For the Court, ‘… it is ne-
cessary to strike an appropriate balance between the requirements attached to the right 
to effective judicial protection ... and those fl owing from the security of the European 
Union or its Member States or the conduct of their international relations’ (emphasis 
added).123 In that case, the Court decided that the non-disclosure of evidence by Euro-
pean Union institutions that they did not have themselves did not violate Mr Kadi’s fun-
damental rights.124 
In the fi rst Al-Dulimi case, Mr Dulimi, listed by the 1483 Sanctions Committee, com-
plained before the European Court of Human Rights that Switzerland had infringed se-
veral of his rights guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights. Mr 
Dulimi argued in particular that his right to a fair trial had been violated following the 
Swiss courts’ refusal to adjudicate on the substance on a case he brought to the courts 
complaining that his assets had been frozen by the Swiss authorities. The confi scation of 
his assets was the result of the implementation, by Switzerland, of Security Council res-
olution 1483. The European Court of Human Rights acknowledged that the right to a fair 
trial could be limited under two conditions: there must be a legitimate aim and the li-
mitation must be proportionate to that aim.125 The aim, namely the maintenance of in-
ternational peace and security, was recognised as legitimate.126 The Court however, 
found that the denial by Switzerland of any judicial review was completely disproportion-
ate to reach that objective. For the Court, the very essence of the right of access to a 
tribunal was impaired.127
The requirements of necessity and proportionality should also apply to action by the 
Security Council that is not enforced by Member States, but by the Council itself. Those 
requirements should in particular determine the lawfulness of the Security Council listing 
measures on diverse sanctions lists. There is no independent and impartial tribunal that 
reviews the listing or de-listing of individuals sanctioned by the Security Council.128 Con-
cerning more particularly the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list, an Ombudsper-
son, independent and impartial, examines requests from individuals and entities seeking 
to be removed from the list. However, the recommendations for de-listing of the ombuds-
person can be overturned by the Sanctions Committee 1267, a subsidiary organ of the 
122 European Commission, Council of the European Union, United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland v Yassin Abdullah Kadi (n 15) para 125. 
123 Ibid para 128. 
124 Ibid paras 138-139. 
125 Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc (n 15) para 124.
126 Ibid para 127.
127 Ibid para 134. The Al-Dulimi case was referred to the Grand Chamber that arrived at the same con-
clusion that the Chamber did but with different legal reasoning. For the Grand Chamber, Switzerland 
had a margin of appreciation in the implementation of Resolution 1483 – a position with which the 
present author disagrees – so that it could allow, and should have allowed, Al-Dulimi access to a 
court as required under art 6 para 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Al-Dulimi and 
Montana Management Inc v Switzerland App no 5809/08 (ECtHR, 21 June 2016) paras 146 and 151.
128 Lists of the sanctions committees and de-listing procedures available at <https://www.un.org/sc/
suborg/en/sanctions/information> accessed 14 June 2016.
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Security Council. Thus, the institution of the ombudsperson does not bring the ISIL 
(Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions regime into compliance with the international right to a 
fair trial.129 This right is guaranteed by the ICCPR and – at least in its core components 
– in non-peremptory customary international law.130 Following the reasoning above, the 
United Nations Security Council could derogate from the international right to a fair trial 
if it where necessary to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and secu-
rity, and the extent of the derogation should be proportionate to that aim. However, in 
the opinion of this author, a complete derogation from the right to access to a judge is 
obviously not necessary to the pursued objective. Indeed, the institution of an interna-
tional tribunal reviewing the listing or de-listing of persons targeted by the Security 
Council would not impair the aim of the Council in maintaining or restoring international 
peace and security. The tribunal could only review the criteria required for the listing, for 
instance, as regards the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions regime, the connection of 
the relevant individual with ISIL (Da’esh) or the Al-Qaida organisation, once the indivi-
dual is already listed and therefore sanctioned.131 The effi cacy of the sanctions regimes 
against individuals would not be jeopardised by the establishment of a tribunal reviewing 
whether the listing is well-grounded.132 It is thus argued here that the derogation from 
the right to a fair trial by the Security Council when it lists individuals is obviously not 
necessary for the fulfi lment of its coercive peace-keeping action and that the Council 
therefore infringes that right. 
III.  An Absolute Obligation of the Security Council to 
Respect Human Rights Contained in Peremptory 
International Law
A. The Obligation
As stated in part II B of that article, the Security Council may derogate from non-
peremptory customary international law relevant to its action. The question is now raised 
whether this possibility also concerns customary international law that is peremptory. In 
conformity with article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that codifi es 
that law, a treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it confl icts with a peremptory 
norm of international law.133 Such a norm, also referred to as jus cogens, is a norm from 
129 GA, Report submitted to the GA by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism (26 September 2012), paras 27-
35, UN Doc A/67/396. See also European Commission, Council of the European Union, United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Yassin Abdullah Kadi (n 15) para 133.
130 Supra n 75.
131 Concerning the establishment of a tribunal to review the listing on the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida 
sanctions list: Report submitted to the GA by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protec-
tion of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism (n 129) para 23 (‘there 
is no sustainable vires objection to the establishment of a mechanism of independent judicial re-
view’). Also Irène Couzigou, ‘La lutte du Conseil de sécurité contre le terrorisme international et les 
droits de l’homme’ (2008) 1 Revue générale de droit international public 49, 81-83.
132 As stated by the European Court of First Instance: ‘A measure freezing funds must, by its very na-
ture, be able to take advantage of a surprise effect and to be applied with immediate effect.’ Ahmed 
Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation (n 16) para 308.
133 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (n 42) 344.
ICL Journal | Vol 10 | 3/2016 | Articles 301
© Verlag Österreich
which no derogation is possible under any circumstance.134 It is unlikely that article 53 
codifi ed a customary international norm that existed in June 1945 when the United Na-
tions Charter was concluded. Furthermore, in accordance with article 64 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty becomes void if it is in confl ict with a new 
peremptory norm of international law.135 Under article 4 of the Vienna Convention, that 
Convention ‘... applies only to treaties which are concluded by States after the entry into 
force of the present Convention with regard to such States’136 – that entry into force 
occurred on 27th January 1980. The International Law Commission seems however to put 
aside article 4 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as regards the rule em-
bodied in article 64 of the same Convention. Indeed, the Commission considers that ar-
ticle 64 applies to former treaties as well as to existing treaties. It refers to ‘... former 
treaties regulating the slave trade, the performance of which later ceased to be compa-
tible with international law owing to the general recognition of the total illegality of all 
forms of slavery’ (emphasis added).137 Article 64 applies therefore to the United Nations 
Charter if it codifi es customary international law.
Such was not the case in 1969 when the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
was concluded.138 Indeed, the inclusion of the concept of peremptory norms of interna-
tional law in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties encountered many diffi cul-
ties.139 Since then a large number of States agreed with most of the provisions of the 
Vienna Convention and ratifi ed it or acceded to it.140 Furthermore State representatives 
as well as international courts and arbitral tribunals or other monitoring organs often 
referred to or applied the notion of jus cogens.141 The International Court of Justice re-
ferred to it for the fi rst time in 2006.142 A majority of academics recognise the existence 
of peremptory international norms and even consider that they do not only apply to 
treaties.143 The identifi cation of jus cogens norms remains highly controversial.144 How-
ever, given the frequent and clear references to the concept of jus cogens, in the practice 
as well as in the literature, it is here argued that there are peremptory norms of interna-
tional law and that the rule in article 64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid 347.
136 Ibid 334.
137 ILC Rep (19 July 1966) 89 UN Doc A/6309/Rev 1. 
138 Wladyslaw Czaplinski, ‘Jus Cogens and the Law of Treaties’ in Christian Tomuschat & Jean-Marc 
Thouvenin (eds), The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order (Nijhoff 2006) 83, 86.
139 The International Law Commission (ILC) considered itself that ‘[t]he emergence of rules having the 
character of jus cogens is comparatively recent’. ILC Rep (19 July 1966) 76 UN Doc A/6309/Rev 1. 
140 114 States are party to the Convention in June 2016. 
141 Antonio Cassese, International Law (2nd edn, OUP 2005) 202-203; Paul Tavernier, ‘L’identifi cation 
des règles fondamentales, un problème résolu? Jus cogens and obligation erga omnes’ in Christian 
Tomuschat & Jean-Marc Thouvenin (eds), The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order 
(Nijhoff 2006) 1, 5-12. 
142 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo v Rwanda) (merits) [2006] ICJ Rep 6, 33 and 52.
143 See the references quoted in Robert Kolb, Théorie du jus cogens international (Presses Universitaires 
de France 2001) 379-386.
144 The prohibition on the use of armed force between States, the prohibition to torture, the prohibition 
of genocide, and the prohibition of slavery are commonly seen in academia as jus cogens norms. For 
an attempt to identify jus cogens norms, see for instance Lauri Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus 
Cogens) in International Law (Lakimiesliiton Kustannus 1988) 315-727; Alexander Orakhelashvili, 
Peremptory Norms in International Law (OUP 2006) 50-66.
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has become part of customary international law.145 The provision of article 64 of the Vien-
na Convention on the Law of Treaties thus applies to the United Nations Charter. In this 
author’s view, applying the content of article 64 to the United Nations Charter prohibits 
interpretation of the Charter so as to allow United Nations organs, in particular the Se-
curity Council, to deviate from jus cogens norms. 
In current international law, there is another, more simple, way to demonstrate that 
the United Nations, and thus also its organs, is bound by jus cogens norms, other than 
the one that resorts to the application of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
Peremptory norms of international law contain essential values for the international com-
munity of States.146 Today, subjects of international law, both States and international 
organisations, must not derogate from norms of jus cogens, either in a treaty or in a 
(non-peremptory) customary international norm147 or a unilateral act.148 Otherwise the 
concept of jus cogens would not make any sense. In accordance with the statement of 
the International Law Commission as early as 1966, ‘… a rule of jus cogens is an over-
riding rule depriving any act or situation which is in confl ict with it of legality’.149
Therefore, it is here submitted that resolutions of the Security Council, even if adop-
ted on the basis of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, have to be in conformity 
with peremptory norms of international law, including with peremptory human rights 
law. This conclusion is shared by international, regional and domestic courts150 as well as 
by a majority of academics, including by those who consider that the Security Council is 
free to derogate from (non-peremptory) customary international law.151 The Draft Arti-
145 Cassese (n 141) 204; Andreas L Paulus, ‘Jus Cogens in a Time of Hegemony and Fragmentation’ 
(2005) 74 Nord J Intl L 297, 330. 
146 During the UN conference on the law of treaties, several State delegations emphasized the impor-
tance of jus cogens norms for the existence of the international community of States. UN Conference 
on the Law of Treaties, First session 26 March-24 May 1968, Summary records of the plenary meet-
ings, UN Doc A/Conf 39/11. Mexico, 52th meeting, 4 May 1968, para 7; Iraq, ibid, para 23; Lebanon, 
ibid, para 42; Uruguay, 53th meeting, 6 May 1968, para 48; Romania, 54th meeting, 6 May 1968, 
para 55; Czechoslovakia, 55th meeting, 7 May 1968, para 25.  
147 Since a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted by the international com-
munity of States from which no derogation is permitted, it must be a customary norm. Indeed, a 
customary norm is ‘evidence of a general practice accepted as law’ by the international community 
of States, in conformity with art 38 of the ICJ Statute.
148 Orakhelashvili (n 144) 206-216; Eric Suy, ‘The Concept of Jus Cogens in Public International Law’ in 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace/European Centre (ed), The Concept of Jus Cogens in 
International Law (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1967) 17, 75; Linos-Alexandre 
Sicilianos, Les réactions décentralisées à l’illicite (Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence 
1990) 340-344. 
149 ILC Rep (19 July 1966) 89 UN Doc A/6309/Rev 1. See also Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Roza-
kis and Cafl isch joined by Judges Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Barreto and Vajić, para 1. (‘By accepting 
that the rule on prohibition of torture is a rule of jus cogens, the majority recognise that it is hierar-
chically higher than any other rule of international law, be it general or particular, customary or 
conventional, with the exception, of course, of other jus cogens norms. For the basic characteristic 
of a jus cogens rule is that, as a source of law in the now vertical international legal system, it over-
rides any other rule which does not have the same status.’) Al-Adsani v The United Kingdom App no 
35763/97 (ECtHR, 21 November 2001) para 1.
150 Dusko Tadić, 1995 (n 20) para 28; Dusko Tadić, 1999 (n 80) para 296; Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al 
Barakaat International Foundation (n 16) para 277; Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council of the European 
Union and Commision of the European Communities (n 15) para 226; Chafi q Ayadi (n 16) para 116; 
Faraj Hassan (n 16) para 92; Youssef Nada v SECO, Swiss Federal Supreme Court, 14 November 
2007, 133 Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts II para 7. 
151 Matthias J Herdegen, ‘The ‘Constitutionalization’ of the UN Security System’ (1994) 27 Vand J 
Transnat’l L 135, 156; Krisch, ‘Introduction to Chapter VII. The General Framework’ (n 85) 
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cles on the Responsibility of International Organizations in particular, assume that any 
act of international organisations, thus including acts of the United Nations Security 
Council, must respect jus cogens.152
The obligation of the Security Council to conform to jus cogens is linked to the obli-
gation of the Council not to require from United Nations Member States a derogation 
from jus cogens, including jus cogens human rights.153 Article 1 paragraph 1 of the Uni-
ted Nations Charter cannot be interpreted so as to allow the Security Council to take 
binding measures whose implementation by Member States involves deviation from pe-
remptory international law. The same applies when Member States transferred the im-
plementation of Security Council action to a regional organisation, such as the European 
Union. Several regional and domestic courts have recognised that the Security Council 
must observe peremptory human rights law when adopting enforcement action to be 
implemented by Member States or a regional organisation, without any margin of discre-
tion.154 In the same vein, academia widely accepts that a measure implementing a Secu-
rity Council resolution does not prevail over a peremptory norm, including a peremptory 
human rights norm, in case of an inconsistency between the two provisions.155 As Judge 
Hersch Lauterpacht stated in his Separate Opinion in the Genocide case: ‘... [t]he relief 
which Article 103 of the Charter may give the Security Council in case of confl ict between 
one of its decisions and an operative treaty obligation cannot ... extend to a confl ict be-
tween a Security Council resolution and jus cogens’.156 Furthermore, reference can be 
made to article 15 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organiza-
tions.157 In accordance with that provision, the United Nations would engage its respon-
sibility if it took coercive measures whose enforcement necessitated a violation by Mem-
ber States of peremptory international law, including peremptory human rights law.
B. Its Application
Which international human rights belong to the category of jus cogens is controver-
sial. But the ICCPR, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the American Con-
vention on Human Rights recognise that certain rights cannot be derogated from by 
1259-1260; Gabriel H Oosthuizen, ‘Playing the Devil’s Advocate: the United Nations Security Council 
is Unbound by Law’ (1999) 12 LJIL 549, 559; David Schweigman, The Authority of the Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Kluwer Law International 2001) 197; Alain Pellet, ‘Rap-
port introductif: peut-on et doit-on contrôler les actions du Conseil de sécurité?’ in Société française 
de droit international (ed), Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies: actes du XXVIIIe colloque 
de Rennes, 2 au 4 juin 1994 (A Pedone 1995) 221, 237; Christian Dominicé, ‘Le Conseil de sécurité 
et le droit international’ in Jeanne Belhumeur & Luigi Condorelli (eds), L’ordre juridique international 
entre tradition et innovation (Presses Universitaires de France 1997) 207, 218. 
152 Art 26 and 41 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (n 16). 
153 In that sense Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the Interpretation and 
Application of United Nations Security Council Resolutions’ (2005) 16 EJIL 59, 77. 
154 Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation (n 16) para 282; Yassin Abdullah Kadi v 
Council of the European Union and Commision of the European Communities (n 15) para 231; Chafi q 
Ayadi (n 16) para 116; Faraj Hassan (n 16) para 92; Youssef Nada (n 150). 
155 Report of the study group of the International Law Commission (ILC) (prepared by Martti Kosken-
niemi) (n 40) para 346 with further references.
156 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht (n 23) para 100.
157 Supra n 36.
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States parties even in a state of emergency.158 Similarly, in the international legal order, 
peremptory human rights norms cannot be derogated from in any international act. 
Thus, the fact that certain human rights cannot be deviated from by the numerous States 
parties to the three human rights treaties referred to above may constitute a sign in fa-
vour of their peremptory international nature.159 The ICCPR has been ratifi ed by almost 
all States in the world;160 all States members of the Council of Europe are party to the 
European Convention on Human Rights;161 a majority of the States members of the Or-
ganization of American States are party to the American Convention on Human Rights.162 
These three general human rights treaties have four non-derogable rights in common. 
Article 4 paragraph 2 of the ICCPR, article 15 paragraph 2 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, and article 27 paragraph 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 
do not allow any derogation to: the right to life, the right not to be tortured or to be sub-
jected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, the right not to be held in slavery or in 
servitude, and the right not to be punished without law.163 Furthermore, in accordance 
with article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the right to life as well as the 
right not to be tortured or to be subjected to cruel or degrading treatment must be guar-
anteed even in armed confl icts, that constitute a category of a state of emergency.164 The 
Geneva Conventions have been ratifi ed by all United Nations Member States. Thus, 
considering the number of States that have recognised the non-derogability of the right 
to life and of the right not to be tortured or subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment in human rights treaties and in the Geneva Conventions, it is here submitted 
that these rights have a peremptory nature under general international law.165 
The prohibition on torture and the prohibition on inhuman and degrading treatment have 
already been recognised as jus cogens norms by international jurisdictions.166 
158 ICCPR art 4, para 2 (n 4) 174; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art 15, para 2 (n 110); American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 
1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) art 27, para 2 1144 UNTS 152.
159 ‘General Comment 29, States of Emergency (Article 4)’ (n 108) para 11. See also Stefan Oeter, ‘Ius 
cogens und der Schutz der Menschenrechte’ in Stephan Breitenmoser, Berhnhard Ehrenzeller, Marco 
Sassoli, Walter Stoffel, Beatrice Wagner Pfeifer (eds), Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law 
(Dike 2007) 499, 509. 
160 168 States in June 2016.
161 47 States in June 2016.
162 23 among 35 States in June 2016.
163 Supra n 158.  
164 Eg Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) art 3, para 1 75 UNTS 32 
and 34. 
165 Frédéric Sudre, Droit européen et international des droits de l’homme (PUF 2015) 197 no 127. 
166 For the prohibition to torture: Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija (Judgment) ICTY-95-17/1 (10 December 
1998) para 144; Al-Adsani (n 149) 101; Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extra-
dite (Belgium v Senegal) (merits) [2012] ICJ Rep 422, 457.
 For the prohibition to inhuman and degrading treatment: Caesar v Trinidad and Tobago (11 March 
2005) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C no 123 para 100; Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al 
Barakaat International Foundation (n 16) para 291; Yassin Abdallah Kadi v Council of the European 
Union and Commision of the European Communities (n 15) para 240. Examing whether sanctions 
applied to the individuals listed on the list of the Sanctions Committee 1267 are contrary to a jus 
cogens norm, the European Court of First Instance stated in these two judgments that the ‘... ex-
press provision of possible exemptions and derogations thus attaching to the freezing of the funds 
of the persons in the Sanctions Committee’s list clearly shows that it is neither the purpose nor the 
effect of that measure to submit those persons to inhuman or degrading treatment’. 
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The right to life knows of exceptions.167 One exception concerns in particular the death 
penalty, providing it is imposed in accordance with the law in force at the time of the 
commission of the crime and pursuant to a judgment.168 Procedural guarantees secure 
the protection of the right to life. Indeed, the non-punishment without law and the right 
to a fair trial guarantee a fair imposition of the death penalty and thus protect the right 
to life.169 The right not to be punished by the death penalty without law and the right to 
a fair trial when the death penalty may be imposed are accessory rights to the right to 
life. Thus, since this latter right cannot be derogated from under general international 
law, the right not to be punished to a sentence of death without law should itself be non-
derogable. Similarly, the right to a fair trial, at least in its core content – determination 
of any criminal charge against an individual by an independent and impartial tribunal – 
should be non-derogable, when applied in a process in which the sentence of death may 
be pronounced.170 Otherwise the intangibility of the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of 
his life could be circumvented. Thus, it is argued that the right not to be punished by the 
death penalty without law and the core components of the right to a fair trial in a process 
that may lead to the death penalty are peremptory. 
In conclusion, in its Chapter VII action, the Security Council must respect and should 
not ask States to derogate from: the right to life; the right not to be tortured or to be 
subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; the right not to be sentenced to the 
death penalty without law; and the most fundamental guarantees of the right to a fair 
trial when a death sentence may be imposed. In practice however, it is very unlikely that 
the Security Council will deliberately derogate from a jus cogens human right or adopt a 
resolution whose implementation necessitates that Member States derogate from such a 
right, for instance a resolution requiring the torture of suspected terrorists. When the 
167 The fact that the right to life is not absolute does not prevent the core content of this right being 
peremptory. Indeed, a rule can be peremptory without its exceptions.
168 ICCPR art 6 (n 4) 174-175; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms art 2 (n 110); American Convention on Human Rights art 4 (n 158) 145. 46 States party to 
the European Convention on Human Rights (art 2) have however ratifi ed Protocol no 6 to the Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the Abolition of 
the Death Penalty in peacetime, and 44 States Protocol no 13 to the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all 
circumstances.
169 The right not to be punished without law is enshrined in: ICCPR art 15 (n 4) 177; Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art 7 (n 110); American Convention on Hu-
man Rights art 9 (n 158) 148. It belongs to the non-derogable rights under those treaties. Supra 
n 158. The right to a fair trial is guaranteed by: ICCPR art 14 (n 4) 176-177; Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art 6 (n 110); American Convention on Hu-
man Rights art 8 (n 158) 147-148. 
 The Human Rights Committee, the European Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights conclude to a violation of the right to life when the death penalty was pronounced 
pursuant to a process in which the right to a fair trial was not respected. UNHRC Communication no 
282/1988 Leaford Smith v Jamaica (1993) UN Doc CCPR/C/47/D/282/1988 para 10.6; The Right to 
Information on Consular Assistancce in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law 
(1 October 1999) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 Series A no 16 
para 135-136; Öcalan v Turkey App no 46221/99 (ECtHR, 12 May 2005) para 166. 
170 Similarly, under the framework of the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee extends the non-dero-
gability of the right to life to the right to a fair trial when the death penalty may be imposed. ‘Gen-
eral Comment 29 States of Emergency (Article 4)’ (n 108) para 15; UNHRC ‘General Comment 32 
(Article 14)’ (2007) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/32 para 6. See also Irène Couzigou, ‘L’incidence du droit à 
la vie sur le droit à un procès équitable dans la jurisprudence du Comité des droits de l’homme’ 
(2010) 114 Revue générale de droit international public 343, 362-363. 
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Security Council does not clearly demonstrate its intention to require from Member 
States a derogation from a jus cogens human right, there should be a presumption that 
the Council did not intend to impose such an obligation. Thus, Security Council resolu-
tions should be, as far as possible, interpreted and implemented by States – or by a 
regional organisation to which States transferred the implementation of Security Council 
action –, in conformity with peremptory international human rights.171 
IV. Concluding Observations
In accordance with the analysis above, the Security Council must in principle respect 
human rights guaranteed in United Nations human rights treaties in force. The Security 
Council should also, in principle, not adopt coercive measures whose implementation by 
United Nations Member States, or a regional organisation, involves a derogation from 
those rights. Deviation from those rights, by the Security Council, Member States, or a 
regional organisation, in the enforcement of Security Council resolutions, without any 
margin of appreciation, is legal only if it is necessary for the success of the Council in 
maintaining or re-establishing international peace and security. The scope of the deroga-
tion must then be as minimal as possible, thus only to the extent required by the aim 
pursued. Furthermore, the Security Council must observe customary international hu-
man rights and should not adopt measures whose enforcement by United Nations Mem-
ber States, or a regional organisation, necessitates that they depart from those rights. It 
must do so, unless a derogation from those (non-peremptory) rights is necessary for the 
maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. Such derogation must 
further be proportionate to the aim pursued, namely the maintenance or re-establish-
ment of peace and security. In sum, the Security Council has a derogable obligation to 
respect human rights, whether they are guaranteed in United Nations human rights 
treaties or also in (non-peremptory) customary international law. It has also a derogable 
obligation not to adopt coercive measures whose implementation by Member States or a 
regional organisation requires that they deviate from those rights. The principle of ne-
cessity-proportionality should justify departures from human rights when the Security 
Council implements coercive measures or when it imposes the implementation of coer-
cive measures to Member States. This principle also applies when Member States trans-
ferred the implementation of Security Council measures to a regional organisation. In 
interpreting the principle of necessity-proportionality, the Security Council should use as 
a model the implementation of the principle of necessity-proportionality justifying dero-
gations from the ICCPR. Finally, the Security Council is bound by an absolute obligation 
to conform to those human rights that are enshrined in peremptory international law. It 
should also not adopt measures whose implementation by Member States or a regional 
organisation involves an infringement of those rights. The Security Council enjoys a 
broad margin of appreciation on whether and how to depart from human rights in United 
Nations human rights treaties in force or in (non-peremptory) customary international 
human rights law, and on whether and how to require a derogation from those rights by 
Member States. Furthermore, there are currently only a few human rights that can be 
171 Case Al-Jedda (n 70). See also in favour of such a presumption Nabil Sayadi and Patricia Vinck 
(n 12) 36 (individual opinion of Sir Nigel Rodley (concurring)).
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considered as peremptory. Thus, in this author’s opinion, the human rights standards 
outlined in this paper restrict the Security Council to a minimum extent. 
Who could monitor observance by the Security Council of legal human rights con-
straints? An extensive analysis of the possibility of review of Security Council resolutions 
as regards international human rights limits is beyond the scope of this article. Only a 
few words will be said here. The International Court of Justice could pronounce, inciden-
tally, on the legality of a Council decision concerning international human rights law in a 
contentious proceeding against any State. It could also assess the human rights legality 
of a Council measure in an advisory opinion, when the question of that legality is direct-
ly asked, or incidentally. However, this will not happen often, given the lack of compul-
sory contentious jurisdiction of the Court and need for a qualifi ed majority for requesting 
advisory opinions.172 Furthermore, the judgment or advisory opinion, even if it will carry 
substantial weight, will not bind the Council. The United Nations Human Rights Commit-
tee and the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights can as-
sess the legality of a State Member’s act implementing a Security Council measure with 
no discretion and, at the same time, pronounce, incidentally, on the legality of the Secu-
rity Council measure towards international human rights standards. These quasi-judicial 
organs can however not take binding decisions. As regards regional human rights bodies, 
such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human 
Rights, or regional or domestic courts, they can also review a measure, implementing 
without leeway for appreciation, a Security Council resolution, for compliance with a 
treaty or a legal order. They can then examine, incidentally, the lawfulness of the reso-
lution itself.173 Courts have already pronounced, incidentally, on the human rights com-
patibility of a Security Council measure with peremptory international human rights 
law.174 They may also assess the compatibility of an act of the Security Council with hu-
man rights treaties and (non-peremptory) customary international human rights law. 
The incidental assessment of the legality of a Security Council resolution by a regional or 
national court is not binding upon the Security Council. However, and this is more of a 
concern for the Security Council, a regional or domestic court can annul or declare illegal 
a measure implementing, with no latitude, a Security Council resolution, because it is in 
violation of human rights guaranteed under the international, or a regional or domestic, 
legal order.175 In doing so, the court hinders the implementation of Security Council ac-
tion. 
Thus, the human rights constraints of the powers of the Security Council are not 
meaningless simply because they are not subject to an institutionalized judicial review. 
Indeed, the reason for the Security Council to have to comply with human rights stan-
172 Art 36 and 65 ICJ Statute and art 96 UN Charter. 
173 Nabil Sayadi and Patricia Vinck (n 12); Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Founda-
tion v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities (n 14); Yassin 
Abdullah Kadi v European Commission (n 14); European Commission, Council of the European Un-
ion, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Yassin Abdullah Kadi (n 14); Nada 
(n 14); Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc (n 14); Abousfi an Abdelrazik v The Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and the Attorney General of Canada (4 June 2009) Federal Court of Canada, 2009 FC 
580. 
174 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities 
(n 14); Youssef Nada (n 150).
175 Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and 
Commission of the European Communities (14); Yassin Abdullah Kadi v European Commission (14).
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dards lies in the existence of a diffuse review that can take different forms. Courts could 
prevent the implementation of a measure applying Security Council action. Furthermore, 
States (individually or collectively) may publicly criticize a Security Council resolution. 
They may even refuse to comply with a resolution that requires from them a departure 
from their human rights obligations. Thus, legal pressure (or another form of pressure) 
pushes the Security Council towards action that is more human rights compatible. For 
instance, it motivated the Security Council to amend the de-listing procedure from the 
then Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions list so that it became more compatible with the right 
to due process.176 Therefore, in order to ensure the effective enforcement of Chapter VII 
action, the Security Council must conform with international human rights limits. As a 
political organ, the Council is not well suited to assess the legal human rights compati-
bility of its decisions. The same remark applies to the Security Council sanctions commit-
tees. Furthermore, the assessment of the Security Council conduct towards human rights 
should be uniform and coherent. Thus, in this author’s view, the Security Council should 
give to only one organ, composed of independent human rights experts, the competence 
to advise it on the conformity of its contemplated action as regards international human 
rights standards. 
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